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NOTES
Constitutional Questions Involved in the
Expenditure of Compulsorily Paid Union Dues
Under the Railway Labor Act
I. INTODUCTON
Prior to the enactment of federal labor legislation the negotiation and
execution of union and closed shop contracts raised many legal questions
of which compulsory payment of union dues and assessments was but one.
Where an employer agreed to a closed' or union shop,2 few legal problems
arose. Frequently, the employer only agreed to a closed or union shop
after considerable pressure had been exerted, thus presenting the problem
of the legality of economic pressure for such an objective. In the absence
of statute, some state courts held that the closed or union shop was illegal,
while others took the view that a strike by a union to obtain a closed or
union shop clause in a contract was a strike for an illegal purpose, even
though the closed shop would have been valid had it been freely negotiated.
Still other courts held that a closed shop was only illegal if such an agree-
ment restrained trade in the particular locality.3
During the depression years, Congress, concerned with the problem of
labor-management relations in the railroad industry, amended the Railway
Labor Act. The 1934 Act did not provide for union security,4 but rather
stated that no carrier "shall require any person seeking employment to
sign any contract or agreement to join or not to join a labor organization."5
In sharp contrast was the 1935 version of the National Labor Relations
Act, which provided that under certain conditions a company and a union
could enter a closed shop contract.6 Two of the basic reasons given for the
later commencement of the union security movement in the railroad indus-
try were a fear of company dominated unions and a strong tradition of
1. A closed-shop provision requires that all employees be members of the union
when hired and remain members in good standing during their period of employment.
2. Workers employed under a union shop agreement need not be union members
when hired, but they must join the union within a specified time and must remain
members during the period of employment.
3. See 5 WILLISTON, CoNTrnAcrs § 1656 (rev. ed. 1937) and the cases cited.
4. The House of Representatives did, however, pass a bill providing for union
security in the railroad industry. H.R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1934);
78 CONG. Rc. 11710-20 (1934).
5. Act of June 21, 1934, c. 691, § 2, 48 Stat. 1188.
6. National Labor Relations Act, c. 372, § 8(3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
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voluntary unionism in that industry.7 In 1947, the National Labor Relations
Act was amended so as to render the closed shop illegal and to allow the
union shop, subject to specified conditions and apparently only in the ab-
sence of prohibitory state laws.8
The subject of union security in the railroad industry was thoroughly
considered in 1950, and the unions succeeded in securing the passage of
a statute allowing a company and a union to enter a union shop agree-
ment. The basic reason advanced by the unions for the passage of such a
bill was that if the union thought it could perform its functions as exclusive
bargaining agent more effectively under a union shop contract, it should be
allowed to bargain for union security. The unions argued that since the
law required them to represent fairly all the workers in the unit, the cost of
representation should be spread over the entire unit.9 This reasoning con-
vinced the House of Representatives.
With these purposes in mind Congress adopted section 2-11 which pro-
vides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, or of any other statute or
law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or
carriers as defined in this Act and a labor organization or labor organizations
duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance with
the requirements of this Act shall be permitted (a) to make agreements,
requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty days
following the beginning of such employment . . . or the effective date of
such agreements . . . all employees shall become members of the labor
organization representing their craft or class .... 10
The provisions of this amendment are different from the Taft-Hartley
amendment in that the former pre-empts conflicting state law, whereas
the latter does not purport to authorize the union shop where forbidden
by a contrary state law. 1 This difference is justified on the basis of a more
direct need for uniformity in the railroad industry than in business gen-
erally.
7. ToNro, TAE CLosED SH oP 93-114.
8. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (1958).
9. The statement of George M. Harrison is fairly typical of the arguments raised
in favor of the union shop: "Activities of labor organizations resulting in the procure-
ment of employee benefits are costly, and the only source of funds with which to
carry on these activities is the dues received from the members of the organization.
We believe that it is essentially unfair for nonmembers to participate in the benefits
of those activities without contributing anything to the cost." Hearings on H.R. 7789
Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1950).
10. Act of Jan. 10, 1951, 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (11) (1958).
11. "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or applica-
tion of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is
prohibited by State or Territorial law." 61 Stat. 151 (1947).
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This note will examine the constitutional issues involved when a union
operating under a union shop contract made pursuant to the Railway Labor
Act collects dues from a member and spends a portion of this money in
support of political causes which the member opposes. The constitution-
ality of such an expenditure can become an issue in a lawsuit when an
employee sues for restitution of dues paid under such a contract. The
constitutional issue can be presented as a defense when the union seeks
to expel the member for non-payment of dues. A company could raise this
question in an action for a declaratory judgment on the validity of the
contract between it and the union, or it could arise by way of defense in a
suit for breach of a union shop contract. The constitutionality of such
expenditures will be treated with respect to: the nature of the constitutional
rights involved; the theory upon which the constitutional rights are violated;
and the appropriate remedies in the event of a violation.
The first case to reach the Supreme Court under section 2-11 was Rail-
way Employees Department v. Hanson.12 This case involved a Kansas
railroad employee who sued to enjoin the enforcement of a contract made
pursuant to section 2-11. It was alleged that the enforcement of the con-
tract requiring the plaintiff to pay union dues constituted a violation of the
first, fifth, and ninth amendments of the United States Constitution. 13
Although no specific finding of fact was made by the state courts as to
whether the union dues were being spent for political purposes, the opinion
of the Nebraska Supreme Court indicates that they were being so spent,
and accordingly it held the act unconstitutional. 14
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Nebraska courts, held that legisla-
tion designed to promote industrial peace in industries affecting interstate
commerce was a legitimate subject for congressional action, and thdt the
function of the judiciary was at an end when it appeared that the measure
adopted by Congress was "relevant or appropriate to the constitutional
power which congress exercises." The court then made a statement that
seemed to be an attempt to limit the case to its facts, but which came to
be a source of confusion in subsequent cases:
[I]f the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover for
forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First
Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the decision in that case. For
we pass narrowly on § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act. We only hold
that the requirements for financial support of the collective-bargaining agency
12. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
13. The allegations of the plaintiffs are fully stated in the state court report of the
case. 160 Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 526 (1955).
14. The Nebraska court objected to employees being required to "make contributions
to any and all of the varied objects and undertakings in which labor organizations are
or may become engaged .... " 71 N.W.2d at 547. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
opinion in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 742, 804 (1961) states
that the Hanson case involved political expenditures.
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by all who receive the benefits of its works is within the power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause and does not violate either the First or the Fifth
Amendments. 15
The Supreme Court's opinion recognizes the constitutionally protected
rights of free speech and association and the necessity that governmental
action meet the reasonableness test of the fifth amendment. The Supreme
Court disagreed with the Nebraska courts on the question of the reasonable-
ness of requiring a worker to give financial support to a union which acts
as his collective bargaining agent. 16 Inasmuch as the Supreme Court found
a valid exercise of power under the commerce clause, and that the regula-
tion was not unreasonable, the Court had no cause to deal with problems
of remedy.
Lower courts experienced considerable difficulty in applying the Hanson
case. The difficulty stemmed from the scope of the Hanson reservation.
If the facts of the Hanson case were that the union was spending money
for political purposes, and that question was before the court, the reserva-
tion in Hanson would seem to be limited to cases where the compulsorily
collected dues were used to impose ideological conformity. On the other
hand, if the facts of the case were that the dues were being spent only in
negotiating and administering contracts, then the reservation of the Court
is substantially broader.17
The North Carolina Supreme Court thought that Hanson had held that
an employee had no constitutionally protected right to challenge the
political expenditures of a union.18 Another state supreme court held that
15. 351 U.S. at 238.
16. "One would have to be blind to history to assert that trade unionism did not
enhance and strengthen the right to work .... To require, rather than to induce, the
beneficiaries of trade unionism to contribute to its costs may not be the wisest course.
But Congress might well believe that it would help insure the right to work in and
along the arteries of interstate commerce. No more than that is attempted here."
351 U.S. at 235.
17. McClair, The Union Shop Amendment: Compulsory Freedom to Join a Union,
42 A.B.A.J. 723 (1956), discusses the Hanson case as though political expenditures were
before the Court. McClair criticized the Supreme Court because it "brushed aside
the finding below that initiation fees, dues, and assessments are used for political
activities and other purposes foreign to collective bargaining .. " Id. at 724. Other
writers have treated the Hanson case as though the question of political expenditures
were not before the Court. See 13 VANo. L. REv. 384 (1959).
18. Allen v. Southern Ry., 249 N.C. 491, 107 S.E.2d 125 (1959). This was a
suit by a minority group of railroad employees to restrain the enforcement of a union
shop contract made pursuant to section 2-11 on the ground that a portion of the dues
collected would be used in support of political causes which the plaintiff opposed. The
jury found as a fact that some of the dues would be used for political purposes. The
majority of the court held that this question had been litigated and decided in the
Hanson case. Of the reservation in Hanson the North Carolina court said: "We do not
think that this language conveys the idea that the financial support required is limited
to such expenditures as the collective bargaining agency incurs while engaged in
the negotiation and servicing of collective bargaining agreements. Rather it indicates
1296 [ VOL. 15
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the Hanson case reserved the question of the constitutionality of political
expenditures.19 Still another court, relying on Hanson, held collections to
be used for political purposes were not contemplated by Congress when it
used the terms "dues" and "assessments" in the Act.20
In the case of International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,21 the Su-
preme Court was presented a record that was adequate to answer the
constitutional issues involved when a union operating under a contract
made pursuant to section 2-11 spends money for political purposes. In this
case a group of employees brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of a
union shop contract made pursuant to section 2-11. They alleged that a
portion of their dues was being spent for political causes they opposed.
The proof that the union was making political expenditures was abundant.22
The trial court entered a decree enjoining the enforcement of the contract
on the ground that section 2-11 violates the federal constitution in that it
permits political expenditure of these employees' union dues. The Supreme
Court of Georgia affirmed.2 The majority of the Supreme Court avoided
the constitutional issues and interpreted the statute as giving the unions
the power to collect dues from all of the workers in the class only for the
purpose of negotiating and administering contracts and in the settlement
of disputes. The statute was held not to authorize the collection of that
part of the dues which would be used for political expenditures because
such expenditures were not germane to the purpose for which the union
shop was created.24
II. NATuRE OF THE RIGHTS
In order for a plaintiff to state a cause of action based on the Constitu-
tion, he must show that he has some right which is protected by that docu-
ment. A plaintiff may claim the right to be secure in his person, rights in
that the required financial support embrace all activities of the collective bargaining
agency reasonably related to its maintenance as an effective bargaining representative."
107 S.E.2d at 133.
19. In Looper v. Georgia, So. & Fla. Ry., 213 Ga. 279, 99 S.E.2d 101 (1957), the
complaining employees alleged that a portion of their union dues would be spent for
objectionable political purposes. The court held that the constitutionality of such
expenditures had not been answered in Hanson, and accordingly held the expenditures
invalid.
20. Sandsbury v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 156 Tex. 340, 295 S.W.2d 412
(1956), held that a "political assessment was not contemplated by the Congress in
using the term 'assessments' in the union shop statute. 295 S.W.2d at 416.
21. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
22. Id. at 744-45 n.2.
23. 215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E.2d 796 (1959).
24. "[W]e construe § 2, Eleventh as not vesting the unions with unlimited power
to spend exacted money . . . . Its use to support candidates for public office, and
advance political programs, is not a use which helps defray the expenses of the negotia-
tion or administration of collective agreements, or the expenses entailed in the adjust-
ment of grievances and disputes." 367 U.S. at 768.
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property, or freedom of expression.25 In the type of action under discussion
the usual allegation is that the collection and expenditure of dues for politi-
cal purposes violates the first and fifth amendments-free speech and asso-
ciation, and due process.
Several lower courts have held that contributions made under a union
shop contract which are used in support of political causes that the em-
ployee opposes violate free speech and association.26 It has been held that
in order for a member to be deprived of free speech the plaintiff must show
that the exaction is tantamount to a personal affirmation of the cause.27
The Georgia court in the Street case found such an affirmation, relying on
cases involving compulsory flag salute statutes.P The state court in the
Hanson case, likewise, thought that freedom of speech was violated,29 but
the Supreme Court in that case held that no issue of free speech was
presented.30 The majority of the Supreme Court in Street, though approv-
ing the denial of a free speech issue in Hanson, declined to rule that
free speech had been violated.3' However, four members of the Court
thought that an issue of free speech was presented by the Street record.
Mr. Justice Douglas seems to have balanced the interests of individual
freedom against the interests of the group and concluded that the individ-
uars freedom outweighed the interests of the group in this case.32 Mr.
Justice Black flatly stated that the expenditures involved in Street violated
the first amendment.33 Justices Frankfurter and Harlan thought that the first
25. See Wellington, The Constitution, The Labor Union, and Governmental Action,
70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961).
26. The Nebraska court in Hanson and the Georgia court in Looper and Street so
held.
27. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
28. 108 S.E.2d 796, 807-08.
29. 71 N.W.2d 526, 545.
30. The Supreme Court said: "We only bold that the requirement for financial
support of the collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work
is within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause and it does not violate
either the First or Fifth Amendments." 351 U.S. at 238.
31. "The record in this case is adequate squarely to present the constitutional ques-
tion reserved in Hanson. These are questions of the utmost gravity. However, the
restraints against unnecessary constitutional decisions counsel against their determina-
tion unless we must conclude that Congress, in authorizing a union shop under § 2,
Eleventh, meant that the labor organization receiving an employee's money should
be free, despite that employee's objection, to spend his money for political causes he
opposes." 367 U.S. at 749.
32. "Some forced associations are inevitable in an industrial society. One who
of necessity rides busses and street cars does not have the freedom that John Muir
and Walt Whitman extolled. The very existence of a factory brings into being human
colonies. Public housing in some areas may of necessity take from apartment buildings
which to some may be as repulsive as ant hills. Yet people in teeming communities
often have no other choice. Legislatures have some leeway in dealing with problems
created by these modem phenomena." 367 U.S. at 775-76.
33. "I would therefore hold that § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, in authoriz-
ing application of the union-shop contract to the named protesting employees who are
1298 [ VOL. 15
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amendment questions had been settled in the Hanson case. Even if these
questions were not settled there, they did not think that the true political
beliefs of these plaintiffs were suppressed.3
A second basis for relief can be found in the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. This point of view was fully developed by the Nebraska
court in the Hanson case. Several due process arguments were developed
by that court. One test of due process is the reasonableness of the rela-
tionship between the regulation in question and the ends it seeks to accom-
plish. The ends sought by section 2-11 of the Railway Labor Act were to
promote the peaceful settlement of disputes in that industry and to end the
free rider problem. The court found that no condition existed in 1951 which
could justify the curtailment of the plaintiff's basic rights.35 Other courts
have adopted views similar to those of the Nebraska court.36 The Supreme
Court, however, held that legislation allowing a company and a union to
enter a union shop agreement was a reasonable exercise of legislative
power.3 7 Whether the Hanson case allows political expenditures of money
so collected depends on the facts which were before that Court.
Mr. Justice Brennan for the majority in the Street case thought that the
Hanson case did not involve political expenditures.
[T]here was nothing concrete in the record to show the extent to which
unions were actually spending money for political purposes ... and nothing
to show that the employees there involved opposed the use of their money
for any particular political objective. (Footnote omitted.) In contrast,
the present record contains detailed information on all these points, and
specific findings were made in the courts below as to all of them.38
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan thought that the Hanson case decided this
question. 39
appellees here, violates the freedom of speech guarantee of the First Amendment."
367 U.S. at 791.
34. "Plaintiffs here are in no way subjected to such suppression of their true
political beliefs or sponsorship of views they do not hold. Nor are they forced to join
a sham organization which does not participate in collective bargaining functions, but
only serves as a conduit of funds for ideological propaganda." 367 U.S. at 805.
35. The Nebraska court said: "It is apparent that the purpose of the amendment
was to get rid of free-riders . . . . Assuming it would be reasonable to require free-
riders to pay their proportionate share of the cost of collective bargaining carried on
in their behalf by labor organizations, we do not think the means selected has any
real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained." 71 N.W.2d at 547.
36. See Looper v. Georgia, So. & Fla. Ry., supra note 17; Sandsberry v. International
Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 18.
37. "We only hold that the requirements for financial support of the collective-
bargaining unit by all who receive the benefits of its work is within the power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause and it does not violate either the First or the
Fifth Amendments." 351 U.S. at 238.
38. 367 U.S. at 747.
39. Of the Hanson record Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "The record before the
Court in Hanson clearly indicated that dues would be used to further what are nor-
1299
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Another approach to the due process problem is to determine whether
political expenditures are germane to the purposes of collective bargaining.
If they are germane, then they meet the due process requirement; if they
are not germane to the purposes of collective bargaining, then they fall
before the due process clause. The courts in Hanson4" and Street41 were
positive that political expenditures were not germane to the collective bar-
gaining process. Others have taken the position that such expenditures are
sufficiently closely related to the maintenance of an effective bargaining
agent that they should not fall before the due process clause.42
III. TBioiY oF CONSTIrUTONAL VIOLATON
The first and fifth amendments are restraints on the federal government.
43
If one private person deprives another of a constitutionally secured right,
the first or fifth amendment is not violated because the federal government
is not the actor. 4
In cases involving political expenditures, the courts which have dis-
allowed such expenditures have usually recognized the issue of government
action and found it present. The Georgia court in the Street45 case and the
Nebraska court in the Hanson 6 case so found. Both of these states had
right-to-work laws; therefore, it was thought that inasmuch as an employee
could not be forced to join a union under local law, the federal government
was the party making the situation possible. The Supreme Court has not
yet taken this step in a case involving political expenditures of a union
operating under federal law. In one case it was urged that a union by
mally described as political and legislative ends. And it surely can be said that the
Court was not ignorant of a fact that everyone else knew. Union constitutions were
in evidence which authorized the use of union funds for political magazines, for
support of lobbying groups, and for urging union members to vote for union-approved
candidates." 367 U.S. at 804.
40. "To require all employees receiving benefits from collective bargaining agree-
ments to pay the labor organizations obtaining them initiation fees, dues, and assess-
ments is to require them to make contributions to any and all of the varied objects
and undertakings in which labor organizations are or may become engaged and which
have no substantial relation to the object here sought to be obtained." 71 N.W.2d
at 547.
41. The Georgia court did not in explicit language say that spending money for
political purposes was not germane to collective bargaining. However, an allegation
in the complaint was addressed directly to this point and the court's remarks which
were addressed to the first and fifth amendment issues seem to be based on the assump-
tion that participation in politics is foreign to the purposes of a labor union. 108 S.E.2d
at 798, 807-08.
42. See DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769
(1947).
43. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S.
79 (1954).
44. Wellington, supra note 25.
45, 108 S.E.2d at 807.
46 71. N.W.2d at 546.
[ VOL. 151300
NOTES
utilizing the services of the National Mediation Board thereby became an
arm of the federal government, but the Supreme Court declined to so
hold.
47
Another theory of constitutional violation would be to construe the
Constitution so that it will apply to arbitrary actions of power against indi-
viduals by all centers of private government.4 8 This suggestion has not
been followed by the Supreme Court, but it has been hinted at by state
courts. 49 Traditionally, labor unions have had the outward appearance of
private organizations and have been so treated by the courts. Those who
would apply the United States Constitution to the internal affairs of labor
unions contend that labor unions can no longer be regarded as private
fraternal organizations.
The corporate organizations of business and labor have long ceased to be
private phenomena. That they have a direct and decisive impact on the
social, economic, and political life of the nation is no longer a matter of
argument. It is an undeniable fact of daily experience.50
A third method of protecting dissenting union members is suggested in
the cases involving the breach of a duty to fairly represent all the em-
ployees. 51 Some of these cases are disposed of by reference to some policy
of Congress, while others seem to base the duty to represent fairly on the
Constitution.5 2 This doctrine has not been directly applied by the Supreme
Court, although it was argued before the Court in the Street case.5 3
IV. ADEQUATE REmmDms
If a court for any reason decides that a union cannot spend compulsorily
collected dues for objectionable purposes, it must devise an appropriate
remedy. If an employee has been discharged for refusal to pay union dues
under such circumstances, he should be re-hired. Many of the state court
cases in this area have been suits to enjoin the enforcement of the entire
47. Federation of By. Workers v. National Mediation Bd., 110 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 628 (1940).
48. See Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of Per-
sonal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. BEv. 933 (1952);
Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 COLUm.
L. REv. 155 (1957).
49. See Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
50. Friedmann, supra note 48, at 176.
51. This could be accomplished by an extension of the doctrine of Steele v. Louis-
ville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). If this approach were adopted, a union which
spent, for objectionable political purposes, dues collected under a union-shop contract
would be held to have violated its duty to fairly represent the entire bargaining unit.
52. For a general discussion of this approach in varying factual contexts, see Cox,
The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 ViLL. L. REv. 151 (1957); Note, Duty of Unions
to Minority Groups in the Bargaining Unit, 65 HaRv. L. REv. 490 (1952).
53. 367 U.S. at 771-75.
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union shop contract.54 State courts have sometimes given this relief.
The Supreme Court, in the Street case, held that an injunction was im-
proper relief. The Georgia court was directed to devise a remedy that
would protect the interests of the dissenting employees to the maximum
extent without undue impingement of those of the majority.55 One sug-
gested remedy would be to deduct from the employee's dues an amount
equal to the relation of the total union political expenditures to the total
dues collected. A second method would be:
restitution to an individual employee of that portion of his money which the
union expended, despite his notification, for political causes to which he had
advised the union he was opposed.56
The Georgia Supreme Court, in turn, instructed the trial court to hold
a hearing for the purpose of determining the amount of these plaintiffs'
money that was spent for political purposes. The only directions given
to the trial court were that if it could determine:
whose money is spent for what . . . and how the plaintiffs can be saved
from harm by any withdrawal from the general fund for political purposes,
and [is] able to formulate a practical method which would afford the relief
which the majority say is due the plaintiffs, then that court is directed to
enter a decree accordingly. 57
If the trial court could not make such a determination, then it was told to
"make use of its equity powers to give the protection by enjoining the
unions from spending any monies for political purposes."58
V. CONcLusION
The Supreme Court, in the Street case, committed itself to the position
of giving some form of protection to dissenting union members. It is
highly unlikely that the Court will declare section 2-11 of the Railway
Labor Act to be an invalid exercise of legislative power even though politi-
cal expenditures are involved.5 9
The Court will receive some criticism for not reaching the constitutional
issues in the Street case. The interpretation given to section 2-11 is indeed
strained; but to hold otherwise, that is, to hold that the internal affairs of
labor unions are to be controlled by the first and fifth amendments, would
create formidable problems.
54. See notes 13, 18, & 23 supra.
55. 367 U.S. at 771-75.
56. Id. at 775.
57. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 217 Ga. 351, 122 S.E.2d 220, 222
(1961).
58. Ibid.
59. See Wellington, supra note 25.
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